The standard New Keynesian model with staggered wage setting is shown to imply a simple dynamic relation between wage in ‡ation and unemployment. Under some assumptions, that relation takes a form similar to that found in empirical applications-starting with the original Phillips (1958) curve-and may thus be viewed as providing some theoretical foundations to the latter. The structural wage equation derived here is shown to account reasonably well for the comovement of wage in ‡ation and the unemployment rate in the U.S. economy, even under the strong assumption of a constant natural rate of unemployment.
Introduction
The past decade has witnessed the emergence of a new popular framework for monetary policy analysis, the so called New Keynesian (NK) model. The new framework combines some of the ingredients of Real Business Cycle theory (e.g. dynamic optimization, general equilibrium) with others that have a distinctive Keynesian ‡avor (e.g. monopolistic competition, nominal rigidities).
Many important properties of the NK model hinge on the speci…cation of its wage-setting block. While basic versions of that model, intended for classroom exposition, assume fully ‡exible wages and perfect competition in labor markets, the larger, more realistic versions (including those developed in-house at di¤erent central banks and policy institutions) typically assume staggered nominal wage setting which, following the lead of Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) , are modeled in a way symmetric to price setting. 1 The degree of nominal wage rigidities and other features of wage setting play an important role in determining the response of the economy to monetary and other shocks. Furthermore, the coexistence of price and wage rigidities has important implications for the optimal design of monetary policy. 2 Yet, and despite the central role of the wage-setting block in the NK model, the amount of work aimed at assessing its empirical relevance has been sur-prisingly scant.
3 This is in stark contrast with the recent but already large empirical literature on price in ‡ation dynamics and …rms'pricing patterns, which has been motivated to a large extent by the desire to evaluate the price-setting block of the NK model. 4 The present paper seeks to …ll part of that gap, by providing evidence on the NK model's ability to account for the observed patterns of wage in ‡ation in the U.S. economy. In order to do so, I reformulate the standard version of the NK wage equation in terms of a (suitably de…ned) unemployment rate. The main advantage of that reformulation is the observability of the associated driving force (the unemployment rate), which contrasts with the inherent unobservability of the wage markup or the output gap, which are the driving forces in standard formulations of the NK wage in ‡ation equation.
The staggered wage setting model à la Calvo (1983) embedded in standard versions of the New Keynesian framework is shown to imply a simple dynamic relation between wage in ‡ation and the unemployment rate, which I refer to as the New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve. Under certain assumptions, that relation takes the same form as the original equation of Phillips (1958) . Furthermore, in the presence of wage indexation to past in ‡ation -an assumption often made in extensions of the basic model-the resulting wage dynamics are consistent with a speci…cation often used in applied work.
The analysis developed here can thus be seen as providing some theoretical 3 A recent exception is Sbordone (2006) . 4 See, e.g. Galí and Gertler (1999) , Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2001) , Sbordone (2002) and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2007) for examples of papers using aggregate data. Micro evidence on price-setting patterns and its implications for aggregate models can be found in Bils and Klenow (2004) , Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) , and Mackowiak and Smets (2008) , among others.
foundations for those speci…cations, as well as a structural interpretation to its coe¢ cients.
In the second part of the paper I turn to the empirical evidence, and show how the New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve accounts reasonably well for the behavior of wage in ‡ation in the U.S. economy, even under the strong assumption of a constant natural rate of unemployment. In particular, the model can account for the strong negative correlation between wage in ‡ation and the unemployment rate observed since the mid-1980s. On the other hand, the lack of a signi…cant correlation between the same variables for the postwar period as a whole can be explained as a consequence of the large ‡uctuations in price in ‡ation in and around the 1970s, in combination with wage indexation to past CPI in ‡ation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model of staggered nominal wage setting. Section 3 introduces the measure of unemployment latent in that model, and reformulates the wage in ‡ation equation in terms of that variable. Section 4 provides an empirical assessment of the model's implied relation between wage in ‡ation and unemployment using postwar U.S. data. Section 5 concludes.
Staggered Wage Setting and Wage In ‡a-tion Dynamics
This section introduces a variant of the staggered wage setting model originally developed in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000; henceforth, EHL) . The latter is given by t j ' if he is employed and zero otherwise, where ' 0 determines the elasticity of the marginal disutility of work, and t > 0 is an exogenous preference shifter. Furthermore, utility is logarithmic in consumption and there is full risk sharing among household members, as in Merz (1995) .
The household period utility corresponds to the integral of its members' utilities, and is thus given by
where C t denotes household consumption, and N t (i) 2 [0; 1] is the fraction of members specialized in type i labor who are employed in period t. Below I discuss the robustness of the main …ndings to a generalization of the previous utility function that is consistent with (empirically more plausible) smaller wealth e¤ects on labor supply.
The relevant decision unit is the household. The latter seeks to maximize
subject to a sequence of budget constraints
where P t is the price of the consumption bundle, W t (i) is the nominal wage for labor of type i, B t represents purchases of a nominally riskless one-period bond (at a price Q t ), and t is a lump-sum component of income (which may include, among other items, dividends from ownership of …rms). The above sequence of period budget constraints is supplemented with a solvency condition which prevents the household from engaging in Ponzi schemes.
As in EHL, and following the formalism of Calvo (1983) , workers supplying a labor service of a given type (or a union representing them) get to reset their (nominal) wage with probability 1 w each period. That probability is independent of the time elapsed since they last reset their wage, in addition to being independent across labor types. Thus, a fraction of workers w keep their wage unchanged in any given period, making that parameter a natural index of nominal wage rigidities. Once the wage has been set, the quantity of workers employed is determined unilaterally by …rms, with households willingly meeting that demand (to the extent that the wage remains above the disutility of work for the marginal worker), by sending its specialized workers with the lowest work disutility.
When reoptimizing their wage in period t, workers choose a wage W t in order to maximize household utility (as opposed to their individual utility), subject to a sequence of isoelastic demand schedules for their labor type, and the usual sequence of household ‡ow budget constraints. 5 The …rst order condition associated with that problem can be written as:
where N t+kjt denotes the quantity demanded in period t + k of a labor type whose wage is being reset in period t, M RS t+kjt t+k C t+k N ' t+kjt is the relevant marginal rate of substitution between consumption and employment in period t + k, and M Log-linearizing the above optimality condition around a perfect foresight zero in ‡ation steady state, and using lower case letters to denote the logs of the corresponding variable, we obtain the approximate wage setting rule
where w log M w . Note that in the absence of nominal wage rigidities ( w = 0) we have w t = w t = w + mrs t + p t , implying a constant markup w of the wage w t over the price-adjusted marginal rate of substitution, mrs t + p t . When nominal wage rigidities are present, new wages are set instead as a constant markup w over a weighted average of current and expected future price-adjusted marginal rates of substitution.
Letting mrs t c t +' n t + t denote the economy's average (log) marginal 5 Details of the derivation of the optimal wage setting condition can be found in EHL (2000) . rate of substitution, where t log t , we can write
= mrs t+k w '(w t w t+k )
Furthermore, log-linearizing the expression for aggregate wage index around a zero in ‡ation steady state we obtain
As in EHL (2000), we can combine equations (2) through (4) and derive the baseline wage in ‡ation equation > 0. In words, wage in ‡ation depends positively on expected one period ahead wage in ‡ation and negatively on the deviation of the average wage markup from its desired value. 6 Equivalently, and solving (5) forward, we have
i.e. wage in ‡ation is proportional to the discounted sum of expected deviations of current and future average wage markups from their desired levels.
Intuitively, if average wage markups are below (above) their desired level, workers that have a chance to reset their wage will tend to adjust it upward (downward), thus generating positive (negative) wage in ‡ation.
6 Note that the previous equation is the wage analog to the price in ‡ation equation resulting from a model with staggered price setting à la Calvo. See Galí and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2002) for a derivation and empirical assessment.
Estimated versions of the model above found in the literature generally allow for automatic indexation to price in ‡ation of the wages that are not reoptimized in any given period. Here I assume the following indexation rule:
for k = 1; 2; 3; :::where w t+kjt is the period t + k (log) wage for workers who last re-optimized their wage in period t (with w tjt w t ), p t is the price in ‡ation variable to which wages are indexed, p denotes steady state price in ‡ation, and g is the rate of growth of productivity (and real wages) in the steady state. In that case the following wage in ‡ation equation can be derived:
where ( household member (i; j), specialized in type i labor and with disutility of work t j ' . Using household welfare as a criterion, and taking as given current labor market conditions (as summarized by the prevailing wage for his labor type), he will …nd it optimal to participate in the labor market in period t if and only if
i.e. whenever the real wage prevailing in his trade is above his disutility from working, expressed in terms of consumption using the household's marginal valuation of the latter.
Thus, the marginal supplier of type i labor (employed or unemployed), which I denote by L t (i), is implicitly given by
Taking logs and integrating over i we obtain
where l t R 1 0 l t (i)di can be interpreted as the model's implied aggregate participation rate, and w t R 1 0 w t (i)di is the average wage, both expressed in logs.
I de…ne the unemployment rate u t as
which, for rates of unemployment of the magnitude observed in the postwar U.S. economy, is a close (and algebraically convenient) approximation to the more conventional measure (L t N t )=L t .
Combining (9) and (10) with the expression for the average wage markup w t (w t p t ) (c t + 'n t + t ) used above yields the following simple linear relation between the wage markup and the unemployment rate
Let us de…ne the natural rate of unemployment, u n t , as the rate of unemployment that would prevail in the absence of nominal wage rigidities. It follows from the assumption of a constant desired wage markup that u n t is constant and given by
Finally, combining (5), (11), and (12) we obtain the following New Keynesian Wage Phillips curve (NKWPC, for short):
Note that the simple linear relation between the wage markup and unemployment derived in this section holds irrespective of the details of the wage setting process. In particular, it also holds in the presence of wage indexation as described in equation (7). In that case we can derive the implied wage Phillips curve by combining equations (8) and (11) to obtain:
which I refer to henceforth as the augmented NKWPC.
Relation to the original wage Phillips curve
In his seminal paper, Phillips (1958) uncovered the existence of a strong inverse empirical relation between wage in ‡ation and the unemployment rate in the U.K. over the period 1861-1957. His analysis was subsequently replicated using U.S. data by Samuelson and Solow (1960) , who showed that a similar empirical relation had been prevalent in the U.S., with the exception of the New Deal period and the early years of the …rst World War. Much of subsequent empirical work turned its focus instead to the relation between price in ‡ation and unemployment, usually in the context of a discussion of NAIRU and its changes (e.g. Gordon (1997) and Staiger, Stock and Watson (1997) ).
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Note that, like the original Phillips (1958) curve, the NKWPC establishes a relationship between wage in ‡ation and the unemployment rate. But two key di¤erences with respect to Phillips'original curve (and some of its subsequent amendments) are worth emphasizing.
Firstly, (13) is a microfounded structural relation between wage in ‡a-tion and unemployment, with coe¢ cients that are functions of parameters that have a structural interpretation, and which are independent of the policy regime. 9 In particular, the steepness of the slope of the implied wage in ‡ation-unemployment curve (given expected wage in ‡ation) is decreasing in the degree of wage rigidity w (which is inversely related to w ). In the limit, as w approaches zero (the case of full wage ‡exibility), the curve becomes vertical. Also, the slope of the ( w ; u) relation is decreasing in the size of the Frisch labor supply elasticity (which corresponds to the inverse of ').
That structural nature of (13) stands in contrast with the purely empirical basis of Phillips (1958) original curve, whose only theoretical underpinning was the plausibility of the principle that "when demand for labour is high and there are very few unemployed we should expect employers to bid wage rates up quite rapidly...".
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Secondly, note that (13) implies that wage in ‡ation is a forward looking variable, which is inversely related to current unemployment but also to its expected future path. This feature, which re ‡ects the forward looking nature of wage setting, is immediately seen by solving (13) forward to obtain
which contrasts with the static, contemporaneous nature of the original Phillips curve, in which expectations play no role.
Next I brie ‡y discuss two extensions of the previous framework. The …rst one allows for changes over time in desired markups, whereas the second introduces a speci…cation of preferences that allows for limited short run wealth e¤ects on labor supply.
10 Phillips (1958) also emphasized the likely existence of nonlinearities due to workers' reluctance "to o¤er their services at less than the prevailing rates when the demand for labour is low and unemployment is high, so that wage rates fall only very slowly." In the analysis of the present paper, as in standard versions of the New Keynesian model, the possible existence of such asymmetries is ignored.
An Extension with Time-Varying Desired Wage Markups
Estimated, medium-scale versions of the New Keynesian model often allow for a time-varying, exogenous desired wage markup, f w t g (see, e.g. Wouters (2003, 2007) ). In that case, the wage in ‡ation equation (shown in its version without indexation, for simplicity) is given by
while the corresponding NKWPC now takes the form
where u n t w t ' denotes the (now time-varying) natural rate of unemployment. Variations in the latter variable, resulting from changes in desired wage markups, may thus potentially shift the relation between wage in ‡a-tion and the unemployment rate.
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Note that we can also write
The previous speci…cation can be compared against one often used in the literature which relies on (16) combined with the de…nition of 11 Equivalently, we can write
In contrast with the representation of the wage equation found in Wouters (2003, 2007) , the error term in the wage in ‡ation formulation proposed here captures exclusively "wage markup shocks," and not preference shocks (even though the latter have been allowed for in the model above). This feature should in principle allow one to overcome the basic identi…cation problem raised by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2008) in their critique of current New Keynesian models. the average wage markup, and which takes the form
where now the error term is given by v 0 t w w t + w t , i.e. it is in ‡uenced by both wage markup shocks and preference shocks. That property contrasts with (17), whose error term captures exclusively wage markup shocks, but not preference shocks (even though the latter have been allowed for in the model). This feature should in principle allow one to overcome the identi…ca-tion problem raised by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2008) 
Robustness to a Speci…cation of Preferences with Limited Short-Run Wealth E¤ects
The assumptions on preferences made above, while analytically convenient, have implications on labor supply that are rather implausible from an empirical viewpoint. In particular, the strong wealth e¤ects implied by the logarithmic speci…cation, while seemingly needed in order to remain consistent with balanced growth, are likely to be counterfactual. This becomes clear by looking at the labor participation equation (9), which implies that the wage-consumption ratio (w t p t c t ) should be positively correlated to labor participation, at least conditional on shocks other than preference shocks being the source of ‡uctuations. In postwar U.S. data, and possibly due to the wage rigidities of the kind emphasized in the present paper, w t p t c t is clearly countercyclical, while participation is procyclical (albeit moderately so). Thus, and unless one is willing to attribute a dominant weight to preference shocks as a source of cyclical ‡uctuations in wages, consumption and participation, equation (9) provides an unsatisfactory account of ‡uctuations in the labor force.
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Here I consider a simple extension of the preferences assumed above that can in principle overcome that problem, by allowing for arbitrarily small short-run wealth e¤ects while remaining consistent with a balanced growth path. Thus, individual utility from consumption is now assumed to be given by t log C t (i; j), where t is a preference shifter taken as exogenously given by each household, but determined by the ratio of aggregate consumption C t to a measure of its trend level. More precisely, I assume t = C t =Z t where
, for all t. Aggregation of individual utilities thus yields the following period utility for the household
The derivation of the wage in ‡ation equation (5) (or (8) , in the presence of indexation) carries over to this case, with the relevant marginal rate of substitution in the optimal wage setting problem now being given
t+kjt . Note, however, that in a symmetric equilibrium C t = C t for all t, which allows us to write the equilibrium (log) marginal rate of substitution as mrs t = z t + 'n t + t , where z t log Z t evolves over time according to z t = #z t 1 + (1 #)c t . The equations for the average wage markup and participation are now respectively given by w t (w t p t ) (z t + 'n t + t )
which can be combined to yield the same simple proportional relation between the wage markup and the unemployment rate as above, i.e. w t = 'u t . Note that the previous speci…cation is still consistent with a balanced growth path since, in the long run, z t will grow at the same rate as consumption.
In the short run, however, the impact of changes in consumption on the marginal rate of substitution may be rendered arbitrarily small by increasing parameter #, thus yielding a more plausible labor supply model. Yet, and most importantly for the purposes of the present paper, the speci…cation of the NKWPC in (13) (or (14)) remains una¤ected. 
. The non-separability of the previous speci…cation for household utility, however, prevents one from interpreting it as the aggregation of the utilities of individual household members. behavior of U.S. unemployment in the postwar period. Formally,
where b u t u t u n and f" t g is white noise. Combining (18) with (14) yields the wage in ‡ation equation
where
or, equivalently,
Estimates of the unemployment process (18) using postwar U.S. data unambiguously point to the following properties: 1 > 1 , 1 < 2 < 0 and 0 < 1 + 1 < 1, the latter being a requirement for stationarity If those inequalities hold then we have 0 < 0, 1 > 0, and > 0. Thus, under the previous assumptions and conditional on the relevant lagged price in ‡ation measure used for indexation purposes, wage in ‡ation should respond negatively to both the level and the …rst di¤erence of the unemployment rate, with the size of that response being a well de…ned function of structural parameters, including those characterizing the process for the unemployment rate.
Interestingly, a speci…cation like (20) has often been proposed and used in empirical applications, albeit without any strong theoretical justi…cation (e.g. Blanchard and Katz (1999) ), as well as in mainstream undergraduate textbooks (though the latter typically omit lagged unemployment). In fact, in his seminal paper Phillips (1958) himself argued that it was plausible that wage in ‡ation would depend negatively on both the level and the change of the unemployment rate, since both captured important dimensions of the degree of tightness or excess demand in labor markets, and tried to uncover their joint in ‡uence on the unemployment rate.
The following section revisits and updates estimates of equations (19) and (20) and reinterprets them through the lens of the New Keynesian model developed above.
Empirical Evidence
The present section provides an empirical assessment of the NKWPC devel- the two is that "compensation" is a more encompassing measure of the cost to the employer, and as such it includes employer contributions to employeebene…t plans or irregular bonuses, whereas "earnings" is restricted to wage income proper (including premium pay for overtime). Unfortunately, and as noted by several authors, the discrepancy between their implied in ‡ation measures is far from negligible. 15 This is made clear by Figure 1 , which plots wage in ‡ation based on both measures. Note that in this and subsequent …gures -though not in the formal econometric work below-wage in ‡ation is measured as the centered four-quarter di¤erence of the log nominal wage expressed in percent terms (i.e., 100*(w t+2 w t 2 )), in order to smooth the high volatility associated with quarter-to-quarter log-di¤erences.
Three features stand out in Figure 1 
A Quick Glance at the Data
The New Keynesian Wage Phillips curve derived in section 3 implies an inverse relation between wage in ‡ation and the unemployment rate, albeit not a simple or contemporaneous one, especially in the presence of indexation.
As a …rst pass in the empirical assessment of the model it seems natural to check whether the raw data hint at any such an inverse relation. Why has the re-emergence of a stable negative relation between wage in‡ation and unemployment over the past two decades gone unnoticed among academic economists? A possible explanation lies in the focus on price in ‡a-tion and away from wage in ‡ation in much of the empirical research of recent years, combined with a lack of a signi…cant empirical relation between price in ‡ation and unemployment. The correlation between those two series over the post-1984 period is low and insigni…cant ( 0:13), and its negative value is due exclusively to the most recent observations: if I end the sample period in 2007Q4 the correlation becomes even smaller and with the wrong sign (0:08). Of course, the theory developed above has nothing to say, by itself, about the relation between price in ‡ation and the unemployment rate, since that relation is likely to be in ‡uenced by factors other than wage setting, including features of price setting and the evolution of labor productivity, among others.
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Next I turn to a more formal empirical assessment of the New Keynesian 16 See, e.g. Blanchard and Galí (2009) and Thomas (2009) for an analysis of the relation between price in ‡ation and unemployment in a model with labor market frictions. Wage Phillips curve.
Estimates of the Reduced Form New Keynesian Wage Phillips Curve
In the present subsection I report estimates of the reduced form wage equation (19). The focus on (19) is motivated by the good …t of an AR (2) implies the cross-equation restriction 1 = 0 2 , which can be easily tested conditional on a value for , which I set to 0:99. Table 1 reports OLS estimates of several speci…cations of the wage in‡ation equation, each of which can be seen as a restricted version of (19).
The wage in ‡ation data is based on the earnings series, and the sample period starts in 1964Q1. The …rst three columns report estimates including only the current value of the unemployment rate, augmented in the case of columns (2) and (3) with lagged quarter-to-quarter price in ‡ation (column (2)) and year-on-year price in ‡ation (column (3)), with the latter expressed as a quarterly rate to facilitate comparison of coe¢ cients. Note that when price in ‡ation is not controlled for, the coe¢ cient on unemployment is very close to zero and statistically insigni…cant. When lagged in ‡ation is added as a regressor its coe¢ cient is highly signi…cant, while the coe¢ cient on unemployment increases in absolute value and becomes signi…cant (though only at the 10 percent level when quarter-to-quarter in ‡ation is used as a regressor).
Columns (5) and (6) ported in columns (5) and (6), suggests a poor …t during the recent recession.
The reason is simple: the rapid increase in the unemployment rate and the very low levels of price in ‡ation (which became de ‡ation for some quarters), lead the …tted wage equation to predict substantial nominal wage de ‡ation.
While actual wage in ‡ation was brought down by the recession, it has always remained positive. The presence of downward nominal wage rigidities, which are ignored in the standard wage setting model developed above, could in principle account for that poor …t. Motivated by that observation, columns (7) and (8) in Table 1 report estimates of the wage equation using data up to 2007Q4, thus avoiding any distortion resulting from the use of recent data.
Note that for both speci…cations, the coe¢ cients on current and lagged unemployment increase substantially and now become highly signi…cant even when quarter-to-quarter price in ‡ation is used as a regressor. Table 1 The "multivariate" model analyzed here implies some restrictions that can be subject to formal testing. In particular, note that if the model holds 18 Standard errors are obtained by drawing from the empirical distribution of A, and re-estimating w and for each draw.
19 See, e.g., Taylor (1999) .
exactly, we must have
Unfortunately the previous set of restrictions is rejected at very low signi…cance levels for our sample and baseline calibration. This may not be surprising, given the simplicity of the model. But, following Campbell and Shiller (1987) , I seek a more informal evaluation of the model by comparing actual and fundamental wage in ‡ation. The last row of Table 3 It is far from the objective of the present paper to claim that the staggered wage setting model of Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) provides an accurate description of U.S. labor markets. It is clear that some of its underlying assumptions,-most noticeably, the unilateral setting of the wage by a monopoly union-are at odds with arrangements prevailing in most sec-
tors. Yet, as a matter of fact, the EHL structure underlies most of the medium-scale DSGE models that have been developed in recent years, by both academics and institutions. Identifying and testing further predictions coming out of those models would seem a worthy undertaking and a source of guidance in any e¤ort to improve the frameworks available for policy analysis. This is, if nothing else, the spirit of the present paper. 
